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Some Effects of European Law on English
Administrative Law
YVONNE CRIPPS*
In this article, Dr. Cripps discusses how European law has
affected English law in recent decades, particularly with regard to
the constitutional supremacy enjoyed by the English legislative
branch. She notes the reception by English judges of concepts of
legitimate expectation and proportionality previously recognized in
some European Community nations. Dr. Cripps predicts that the
English bench will be increasingly willing to take European law
into account in their decisionmaking.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current doubts about the European exchange-rate mechanism and
ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht will be of concern to those seeking
closer European union, but such difficulties do not detract from the impact
that European law-both in terms of European Community law and the
domestic law of European nations-has already had upon the domestic
administrative law of Britain. This article is mainly concerned with what
might be called the osmotic effects of European law. These effects are
created by principles of European law which, even when not directly
applicable through European Community law, are either indirectly derived
from Community law or from legal doctrines that feature in the
jurisprudence of individual European states and then filter through into
English domestic administrative law. This article does not dwell on
principles such as equality and legal certainty. These are part of Community
jurisprudence but have not been expressly and independently voiced in
English common law as a result of European influences outside the sphere
of applicable Community law.
* Director of Studies in Law, Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge. I would like to
thank Dean Alfred C. Aman for making this lecture possible and to acknowledge my debt to his book,
ADMNISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA (1992).
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II. THE BACKGROUND: SOVEREIGNTY AND REMEDIES
Since the passage of the European Communities Act 1972, which
incorporated the Treaty of Rome into English domestic law,' the
fundamental English constitutional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has
been limited in certain fields. The English constitution does not embody a
real or even a putative separation and balancing of powers of the kind that
exists in the United States. In England prior to 1972 the legislative branch
was unquestionably supreme. Its legislative acts could not be directly
challenged in the courts if they were validly passed. In the post-1972 era
the legislative branch still occupies a very dominant position in relation to
the other branches in the United Kingdom. Even if a sovereign parliament
could by entrenchment fetter its power to repeal legislation, there is no
purported fetter of this kind in the European Communities Act, and thus
parliament could repeal it.
The judicial, legislative, and executive branches in Britain are not only
not equal, but also not separate. The British Prime Minister, for example,
is a pivotal member of both the legislative and executive branches, while the
Lord Chancellor is a member of all three branches. This is the background
against which the European Court of Justice (the Court of the European
Communities) and the English courts have had to decide issues of
sovereignty. There can be little doubt that, in certain areas, the English
parliament ceded sovereignty to the Community in the 1972 European
Communities legislation. But, at first, some English judges, led in this
matter by the redoubtable Lord Denning, were reluctant directly to
acknowledge any cession of sovereignty to foreign institutions.
The matter has, however, been addressed by the House of Lords and the
European Court of Justice, most notably in the Factortame2 litigation,
which involved an English statute alleged to be in conflict with European
Community law. In Factortame, the applicant company, which was largely
Spanish-owned, applied to the English High Court for judicial review of
administrative action on the grounds that certain provisions in the Merchant
Shipping Act 1988' were in conflict with Community law. The provisions,
I. The Single European Act of 1986 was incorporated into English law by the European
Communities (Amendment) Act 1986.
2. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, exparte Factortame Ltd. [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 353.
3. Merchant Shipping Act, 1988, ch. 12 (Eng.).
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if applied, would have prevented Factortame from registering its fishing
vessels in the United Kingdom because the company was not at least
seventy-five percent British-owned. The High Court, using the reference
procedure provided for in article 177 of the Treaty of Rome,4 requested that
the European Court give a preliminary ruling interpreting Community law
on this issue. Factortame also requested interim relief in an attempt to
suspend the operation of the relevant part of the Merchant Shipping Act
until the European Court had given its decision on the alleged conflict
between the Act and Community law. At a later stage the House of Lords
(using the article 177 procedure) referred to the European Court the question
whether Community law required that interim relief be given by the national
court pending a determination by the European Court on the question of
compatibility with Community law. The European Court answered that
question in the affirmative, and on the reference back from the European
Court to the House of Lords, their lordships granted an interim injunction
pending the European Court's decision on incompatibility. 5 In a separate
judgment, the European Court eventually declared that nationality
requirements of the kind under dispute in Factortame did not conform to
Community law.6
So we see in this litigation a successful attack by the applicants on the
validity of English legislation in a country which, outside a Community
context, acknowledges no equivalent of Marbury v. Madison.7 Community
law was clearly dominant, and the mere possibility of incompatibility
between national law and Community law led to the creation of an
exception to what had been viewed by English judges as a lack of
jurisdiction to grant interim relief against the Crown since the passage of the
Crown Proceedings Act 1947.' The House of Lords in Factortame held
that this could not prevent an English judge from granting relief where
Community law, as elucidated by the European Court of Justice, required
that course of action.
4. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
5. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd., (No. 2) [1991] I App.
Cas. 603, 658.
6. Id.
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
8. Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & I I Geo., ch. 44 (Eng.).
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There was no question of damages in Factortame. However, a claim for
damages was in my view erroneously rejected9 by the English Court of
Appeal in the Bourgoin S.A. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food
case1" in respect of an alleged breach of the Treaty of Rome. The decision
of the European Court of Justice in the Francovich case" establishes that
individuals can claim damages against Member States if they suffer harm as
a direct result of the State's failure validly to implement a directive that is
for the benefit of individuals. This decision may well have far-reaching
effects in other situations in which damages are sought for breaches of
Community obligations, and it seems very likely that the Bourgoin case
would have been decided differently had it occurred after Francovich. The
European Commission is currently considering whether either the European
Court or the Commission should be given the power to fine Member States
which do not comply with judgments of the Court or which fail to transpose
directives. The Francovich case offers a more subtle way of dealing with
the latter situation.
In terms of national sensitivities it is important to note that the article
177 reference procedure does not give the European Court the power to
interpret or strike down domestic law. Article 177 grants the European
Court jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning, inter alia, the
interpretation of the Treaty to the extent that, where such a question is raised
before a court or tribunal of any Member State, the court or tribunal may,
if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary in order to give
judgment, request the European Court to give a preliminary ruling on the
issue. Thus, the discretion concerning whether and when to refer is left to
the national court, and the European Court does not in theory interfere with
the domestic law. 2 It is ultimately for the domestic court to decide the
validity of the domestic law in light of the ruling given by the European
Court on the meaning or validity of the Community law. In this way the
sensibilities of national courts are preserved in cases of incompatibility,
although in practice the domestic court may be left with little choice but to
comply with a ruling by the European Court. It must also be remembered
9. See Yvonne Cripps, European Rights, Invalid Actions and Denial of Damages, [1986] 45
C.L.J. 165.
10. Bourgoin S.A. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food (1986] Q.B. 716.
I1. Francovich v. Italian Republic, (ECJ cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 of 19 Nov. 1991) [1992]
I.R.L.R. 84.
12. See GORDON SLYNN, INTRODUCING A EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER (1992).
[Vol. 2:213
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that, because the Treaty of Rome has been incorporated into English
domestic law, national courts may determine questions of incompatibility
between Community law and domestic law without referring to the
European Court.
Another major European treaty to which Britain has acceded is the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
1950,"3 but this treaty has not been incorporated into English domestic law
and thus its effects are, at best, indirect. The European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms created the European Court of
Human Rights which is based in Strasbourg and must not be confused with
the European Court of Justice based in Luxembourg. As its title suggests,
the European Convention enumerates certain fundamental rights and
freedoms. 4  These resemble quite closely the amendments to the
Constitution of the United States. The Treaty of Rome, the primary
European Community treaty, does not concern itself in express terms with
as wide an array of rights and freedoms. The European Court of Justice
has, however, developed some general principles of law through which the
interests of persons in Member States of the Community may be
safeguarded. These principles include the concept of proportionality.
III. PROPORTIONALITY
Proportionality is an example of a concept that is part of Community
law and which is sometimes applied in English courts as a direct result of
Community law. At other times it appears in English law as a result of
indirect Community influences or influences from the domestic law of other
European States or because of the indirect effect of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The concept of proportionality appears first to have been recognized as
a general principle of law in Germany, but it has also been applied in a wide
range of cases in France, the Netherlands, and other Member States of the
European Community. Perhaps the best summary of the principle is to be
found in a set of guiding principles attached to a Recommendation of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in which one of the
13. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
14. T. Koopmans, European Public Law: Reality and Prospects, 1991 PUB. L. 53.
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principles recommends that an administrative body "maintain a proper
balance between any adverse effects which its decision may have on the
rights, liberties or interests of persons and the purpose which it pursues."' 5
This extends far further than the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.
The application of proportionality in English law as a direct result of
European Community law is illustrated by Regina v. Intervention Board for
Agricultural Produce, ex parte E.D. & F. Man (Sugar) Ltd.'6 An exporter
who wished to export sugar to a country that was not a member of the
European Community had to obtain a license from the appropriate national
organization. An applicant was required to deposit a sum to guarantee that
the export was effected during the five-month period of the license. The
deposit was lodged when the exporter submitted a tender to the organization.
If the tender was accepted, he was required to apply for a license within a
specified period. Article 6(3) of Commission Regulation 1880/83 provided
that the security was forfeited if the exporter did not apply for the license
within the specified period, except in a case of force majeure. As a result
of an oversight, Man (Sugar) Ltd. did not apply for the license until an hour
or two after the expiration of the period and therefore forfeited the whole
sum deposited. The company sought, in the Queen's Bench Division of.the
English High Court, the repayment of the security, arguing that the decision
concerning forfeiture was invalid. On a reference from the English High
Court under article 177 of the Treaty, the European Court ruled that article
6(3) was invalid since it offended the principle of proportionality. 17 The
forfeiture of the whole of the security for an infringement of the obligation
to obtain a license, which was less serious than the failure of the primary
obligation to export (which the security itself was designed to guarantee),
was too drastic a penalty. The Divisional Court of the English High Court
was then faced with an application for judicial review brought by the
company, which sought a declaration that the decision that the security be
forfeited was unlawful and invalid. In the light of the finding by the
15. Concerning the Exercise of Discretionary Powers by Administrative Authorities,
Recommendation No. R(80) 2 of the I I th of March 1980. The Council of Europe, founded in 1949, is
the international organization under the auspices of which the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms was drafted.
16. Regina v. Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, exparte E.D. & F. Man (Sugar) Ltd.




European Court that article 6(3) of Regulation 1880/83 was invalid because
it breached the proportionality principle, the Divisional Court declared that
the decision to forfeit the security was invalid.'"
In this case, the English courts were giving effect to the principle of
proportionality because of relevant Community law. Proportionality may
also be regarded as an applicable principle outside the sphere of judicial
review applications. There are references to proportionality in cases under
the European Convention on Human Rights. For example, in the Sunday
Times v. United Kingdom case, 9 the European Court of Human Rights
held that the restriction imposed on the plaintiff's freedom of expression
"proves not to be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."2
The right to freedom of expression described in article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights21 was considered by the English
courts in the "Spycatcher" litigation. At first instance in one of the domestic
"Spycatcher" proceedings22 Scott J. observed that:
[t]he public interest in freedom of the press to report the court
action outweighs, in my view, the damage, if any, to national
security interests that the articles might, arguably, cause. I can see
no "pressing social need" that is offended by these articles. The
claim for an injunction against these two newspapers was not, in my
opinion, "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
23
Lord Goff also adopted these words in the decision of the House of Lords
in the same case.24 Yet it might be argued that their lordships were doing
no more in this litigation than simply exploring the equitable discretionary
features of injunctive relief.2"
A less ambiguous example of the circumstances in which proportionality
may apply in an English case is found in Regina v. Barnsley Metropolitan
18. Id. at 126.
19. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 67 (1979).
20. Id.; see also Jeffrey Jowell & Anthony Lester, Q.C., Proportionality: Neither Novel nor
Dangerous, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW (1988) 51, 58.
21. European Convention, supra note 13, art. 10.
22. Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd., (No. 2) [1991] 1 App. Cas. 109.
23. Id. at 164-65.
24. Id. at 290.
25. See YVONNE CRIPPS, THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DISCLOSURE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(1987), 23.
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Borough Council, ex parte Hook.26 The Barnsley Borough Council had
suspended a market stall-holder's license to trade after he behaved
offensively in the street. The Court of Appeal quashed the Council's
decision on the ground that the stall-holder had not had a fair hearing, which
is one of the well recognized elements of English natural justice-the
equivalent of due process. But Lord Denning was also prepared to quash
the decision on the ground that the punishment was altogether excessive and
out of proportion to the occasion. He clearly felt that effectively to deprive
the man in question of his livelihood was out of proportion to his
misconduct.
Unfortunately, however, the proportionality principle has not received
the unqualified support of English judges. In Regina v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, ex parte Brind27 the House of Lords held that
proportionality did not exist as a distinct principle of English law outside the
head of review of administrative discretionary power for
unreasonableness-the equivalent of review of arbitrary and capricious
administrative behavior in the United States. Brind involved an application
by various journalists employed by the BBC and the Independent
Broadcasting Authority (IBA). These journalists sought a declaration that
the Home Secretary acted illegally when he banned representatives of certain
Irish organizations from speaking on television or radio (as opposed to
through television actors or journalists reading or repeating their statements
for them). The journalists also sought certiorari to quash the decisions of
the Home Secretary. It is interesting to note that there is an even wider ban
in the Republic of Ireland by the Irish authorities themselves, which extends
to the reporting or repeating of the words of the banned organizations. The
journalists argued that the Home Secretary's decisions were unlawful on
several different grounds. One ground was that the Home Secretary had
gone beyond the lawful use of his powers, under section 29(3) of the
Broadcasting Act 1981 in relation to the IBA and in relation to the BBC,
under certain clauses of the license and agreement contained in a deed made
between the Secretary of State and the BBC-the terms of the Act and the
agreement were not materially different. It was argued that the Secretary of
State had gone beyond the lawful use of those powers because his directions
26. Regina v. Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, ex parte Hook [1976] I W.L.R. 1052.
27. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 App. Cas.
220 [Vol. 2:213
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to the BBC and the IBA were out of proportion to the mischief that he
sought to avoid.
Another ground was that the Secretary of State's decisions were
unreasonable in the narrow sense of being absurd. Their lordships in the
House of Lords concluded that counsels' arguments on lack of
proportionality were simply an aspect of their challenge on the grounds of
what is known in England as Wednesbury unreasonableness.28 The Court
of Appeal went somewhat further than either the Divisional Court or the
House of Lords in Brind in acknowledging the existence of proportionality
as a separate ground for review. Lord Donaldson, then Master of the Rolls,
referred to Lord Diplock's speech in Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for the Civil Service 9 (where Lord Diplock described
proportionality as a possible ground for judicial review) and noted the
existence of the principle in European Community law. He pointed out that
the judicial review jurisdiction had been developed and was still being
developed by the judges. But he also warned of the danger of a principle
like proportionality leading the courts into an assessment of the substance
rather than the legality of administrative decisionmaking. Ultimately, their
lordships in the House of Lords decided that the decisions of the Secretary
of State that were challenged in Brind were not narrowly unreasonable (or
absurd) and thus the journalists failed in their application.
We have by no means heard the last of the principle of proportionality
as a separate head of review in England. We have noted that the
proportionality principle evolved in certain Member States of the European
Community, and it may well prove to be significant that Sir Gordon Slynn,
speaking at the Law Society's Annual Conference in October 1991, after the
Brind case, suggested that the proportionality principle was likely to become
an important feature of English law. Sir Gordon, who was Britain's judge
at the European Court of Justice and is fervently pro-European, has now
been appointed to the House of Lords, where he is almost certain to
emphasize the European dimension of administrative law.
It seems to me that judges should be as specific as possible about their
grounds for attacking a decision. They should not, for example, hide behind
the broad sweep of unreasonableness if disproportionality is really the
problem. References to Wednesbury unreasonableness have been sprinkled
28. See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] I K.B. 223.
29. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 App. Cas. 374.
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very liberally through English judicial review cases in recent years, and
there is a danger that judges' motives will fall under suspicion if they refuse
to divide unreasonableness into separate, more specifically identified
grounds for review. It cannot, however, be denied that a separate head of
review of disproportionality may facilitate challenges to administrative
action when that action might not otherwise be held to be so unreasonable
as to be absurd in the narrow Wednesbury sense.
IV. LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS
Like proportionality, legitimate expectations are recognized in the
domestic law of some European nations, notably Germany. They too apply
in Community law and in English domestic law, even when there is no
relevant issue of Community law. Legitimate expectations have also been
invoked under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.3°
In very broad terms, an entity may have a legitimate expectation of fair
procedure in decisionmaking or, to use another formulation of the concept,
a legitimate expectation may act in law to provide the holder of the
expectation with protective safeguards without which he cannot validly be
deprived of the thing that he expects. A legitimate expectation may also
confer standing on the holder of the expectation.3
Under Community. law, nation-states may hold legitimate expectations.
For instance, in Case 84/85, United Kingdom v. Commission of the
European Communities,32 the European Court of Justice declared void a
European Commission decision of December 1984 that reduced the grants
to the United Kingdom from the European Social Fund for the 1984
financial year. The decision was held to be void because it ignored the
legitimate expectation of the United Kingdom that the methods of
calculation would not be different from those previously announced.
30. See Campbell v. Fell, 80 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 72 (1984); Abdulaziz, Cabales v.
Balkandali, 94.Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 61 (1985); Pudas v. Sweden, Decisions and Reports of the
European Commission of Human Rights 234 (1985); Report of the European Commission in the Tre
Traktorer Aktiebola Case, 10 Nov. 1987, para. I11.
31. See In re Findlay [1985] App. Cas. 318; O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 App. Cas. 237.




The first English judge to employ the term "legitimate expectation" was
Lord Denning in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs.33
Schmidt, a scientologist, had been unsuccessful in his application to remain
in the United Kingdom beyond the period specified in his entry permit.
When he appealed, the Court of Appeal held that the Home Secretary had
not acted unfairly by failing to give him an opportunity for a hearing, in that
Schmidt had no right to continue to stay in the country and no legitimate
expectation of so doing. He only had a legitimate expectation of staying
(and, it was suggested, the chance of a hearing) with regard to the period up
to the expiration of his permit. This therefore seemed to indicate that a
promise or undertaking could create a duty to act fairly with regard to the
promise or undertaking if it had been relied upon. The particular words
used are especially important in terms of the controversy over whether
legitimate expectations provide only procedural protection or actually
guarantee an expected substantive outcome.34 Lord Denning observed that
the protections of fairness would in part depend on "whether he has some
right or interest, or, I would add, some legitimate expectation of which it
would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say."35
This passage suggests that what is envisaged is an obligation to afford the
relevant person an opportunity to present his case before any decision is
taken that could thwart his legitimate expectation. Compared with those in
most of the later cases, Lord Denning's formulation here is a slightly
unusual one in that it suggests that if a legitimate expectation had existed in
Schmidt, it would, in terms of Lord Denning's words in the quoted passage,
have been a legitimate expectation of staying in the country, of which
Schmidt could not be deprived without a hearing, rather than a legitimate
expectation of a hearing. But with either formulation, the protection of the
courts would not extend beyond ensuring that lawful procedures were
followed before a ministerial decision was taken on the substantive
immigration issue.
Lord Denning adopted the same approach a short time later in Breen v.
Amalgamated Engineering Union36 where, as the dissenting judge in the
33. Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch. 149.
34. C.F. Forsyth, The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations (1988) 47 C.L.J. 238;
P.P. Craig, Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual Analysis (1992) 108 L.Q.R. 79.
35. Schmidt [1969] 2 Ch. at 170.
36. Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 Q.B. 175.
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Court of Appeal, he restated his view that a person should not be deprived
of a legitimate expectation without a hearing. He seemed to see this as part
of the duty to act fairly-a duty that in England is normally associated with
the rules of natural justice. Breen had not been given a hearing or a
statement of reasons before a trade union committee had refused to approve
his election as a shop steward. All their lordships agreed that the committee
was under a duty to act fairly but Lord Denning, alone in referring to
Breen's legitimate expectations, was the only member to decide that the
committee had not in fact acted fairly.
Another major case on legitimate expectations is Attorney General of
Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, 37 a decision of the Privy Council on appeal
from Hong Kong which might appear in some future lecture in this series
as an illustration of the osmotic spread of European principle via the Privy
Council to the "Empire. 38 In the Hong Kong case their lordships decided
that the respondent illegal immigrant, because of the words "each case will
be treated on its merits," had a legitimate expectation of a hearing.
Legitimate expectations were said to include expectations that were not per
se legally enforceable, although the court felt that there must be a reasonable
basis for the expectation. Lord Fraser noted that "the principle that a public
authority is bound by its undertakings as to the procedures it will follow,
provided they do not conflict with its duty, is applicable to the undertaking
given by the Government of Hong Kong to the applicant.
39
A general doctrine, of estoppel is far from established in English law and
decisionmakers must not fetter their discretion in advance; hence their
lordships' emphasis on procedure rather than substance. In addition to the
passage cited above, Lord Fraser, referring to Regina v. Liverpool
Corporation, ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association,40
interpreted the court order in that case as being "limited to ensuring that the
corporation followed a fair procedure by holding an inquiry before reaching
a decision: provided such procedure was followed, the decision was left
with the corporation to whom it had been entrusted by Parliament. '4, Thus
37. Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 App. Cas. 629.
38. Compare, however, the Ng Yuen Shiu decision with the decision of the Privy Council on
appeal from New Zealand in Butcher v. Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. [1991] I N.Z.L.R. 641.
39. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 App. Cas. at 638.
40. Regina v. Liverpool Corporation, exparte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association [1972]
2 Q.B. 299.
41. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 App. Cas. at 637.
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it is clear that what their lordships envisaged in the Hong Kong case was
"merely"-if one can use that word in such a context-the protection of the
legitimate expectation of a hearing, or the equivalent of procedural due
process in the United States.
The decision of the House of Lords in the Council of Civil Service
Unions case42  also contains a discussion of legitimate
expectations--expectations that were then ignored by their lordships on the
basis of a perceived risk to national security. In this case, Lord Diplock
attempted to elaborate upon, or at least explain, the nature and effect of a
legitimate expectation.43 He indicated that legitimate expectations may
arise either when a person is affected because rights or obligations that are
enforceable by or against him in private law are altered, or because an
express promise is given on behalf of a public authority, or because a
regular practice exists that the claimant can legitimately expect to continue.
To that one can also add that legitimate expectations may arise from a
newly adopted policy guideline as in Regina v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, ex parte Khan.44
The House of Lords confirmed in the Civil Service Unions case that the
concept of legitimate expectations is part of English law. Their lordships
observed that legitimate expectations are now firmly entrenched in
administrative law and are closely connected with the "right to be heard."
They also observed that an expectation may take many forms. There may
be an expectation of prior consultation or an expectation of being allowed
time to make representations, especially where the aggrieved party is
seeking, on account of exceptional circumstances, to persuade an authority
to depart from a lawfully established policy adopted in connection with the
exercise of a particular power. Their lordships also noted that the
application of the concept did not depend upon the existence of a private
right and even went so far as to suggest that a legitimate expectation could
be based on a benefit or privilege that conflicted with the private law rights
of the holder of the expectation.4" The Civil Service Unions case led to a
42. Council of Civil Service Unions (1985] 1 App. Cas. at 374.
43. Id. at 408.
44. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, exparte Khan [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1337
(C.A.).
45. The European Commission on Human Rights rejected as "manifestly unfounded" the Council
of Civil Service Unions' appeal to that body, so the case did not proceed to the European Court of
Human Rights. Again the decision turned on national security, which is specifically provided for in the
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dramatic growth in applications based on legitimate expectations. Robert
Riggs points out that more than three times as many expectation cases were
decided between 1985 and 1987 as in all the previous years combined.46
None of what has been put forth so far is intended to suggest that
legitimate expectations only arise as a result of promises or established
practices or, as Lord Diplock remarked in the Civil Service Unions case, the
withdrawal of benefits. 7 In Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex
parte Greater London Council,48 McNeill J. reviewed the Secretary of
State's direction to the Greater London Council (GLC) to pay 281 million
pounds to London Regional Transport. This direction was made without
consulting the GLC, not least, one suspects, because the Secretary of State
had not had a past practice of consulting with the GLC (this also meant that
there could be no suggestion of withdrawal of a benefit previously enjoyed).
Nor had the Secretary of State promised or indeed suggested that he would
consult the GLC. Despite this, the judge, after reviewing the legitimate
expectations cases, simply declared that:
Parliament had legislated for a maximum payment in the initial
year. That assumes that less than the maximum could be directed.
Whichever phrase be used--duty to act fairly, legitimate
expectation, a right to be heard-it seems to me that natural justice
entitles the payer at least to make representations to the effect that
he should not pay the maximum, but some lesser sum.49
With regard to legitimate expectations arising from ministerial policy
guidelines, the Khan case5" arising only a matter of months after the Hong
Kong case, is sometimes, and in my view erroneously, held out as an
example of the courts actually holding a minister substantively to his
statement of policy. Mr. Khan wished to adopt the child of a relative not
resident in the United Kingdom. After adoption he intended to bring the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See Michael Evans, Unions Lose
GCHQ Case, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 27, 1987, at 20.
46. Robert F. Riggs, Legitimate Expectation and Procedural Fairness in English Law (1988) 36
AM. J. COMP. L. 395, 399.
47. Council of Civil Service Unions [1985] 1 App. Cas. at 408.
48. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Greater London Council [1986] 1 Q.B.
556.
49. Id. at 556, 587.




child into the country. The Minister responsible for the policy governing
foreign adoptions had broad discretion to approve or refuse applications of
this nature. The Ministry had a standard form letter that it handed out in
response to general inquiries concerning foreign adoptions. The letter set
out the procedure for applicants to follow in respect of such adoptions and
the criteria on which the applications would be considered. Mr. Khan read
the letter and his application met the criteria, but his application was
refused.
In quashing the refusal, Parker L.J. held that the information in the letter
raised a legitimate expectation, on the part of those who read it, that their
applications would receive consideration on the basis of the procedures and
the criteria set out." In Khan's case, the Minister, in exercising broad
discretion, had refused permission for reasons entirely different from the
stated ones. 2 While Parker L.J. was critical of the Minister's approach he
did not interfere with the scope of the ministerial discretion. He held that,
where legitimate expectations are created by such representations, an
application that is to be refused for reasons other than those disclosed in
advance as being the normal criteria, cannot be refused without notice and
a hearing." His Lordship (echoing similar statements in the Liverpool
Corporation case) held that even where such notice of change of policy is
given and an opportunity to be heard is provided, the new policy must be
of overriding public interest to justify a refusal other than on the basis of the
publicly stated criteria.' Dunn L.J. concurred with Parker L.J. in holding
that the Minister's decision ought to be quashed, but he arrived at that
conclusion by going a step beyond fairness and legitimate expectations. For
Dunn L.J. a decision so unfair could not be reasonable." Watkins L.J.
refused to place any constraints on the Minister's discretion to make and
apply policy.56
It is, however, important to note that even Parker L.J. was referring to
procedural rather than substantive protection. For instance, he stated that:
51. Id. at 1347.
52. Id. at 1339-43.
53. Id. at 1347-48.
54. Id. at 1347.
55. Id. at 1351-52.
56. Id. at 1351.
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[t]he Secretary of State is, of course, at liberty to change the policy
but in my view, vis-A-vis the recipient of such a letter, a new policy
can only be implemented after such recipient has been given a full
and serious consideration whether there is some overriding public
interest which justifies a departure from the procedures stated
57
And again, in the penultimate paragraph of his judgment, he said:
I would allow the appeal and quash the refusal of entry clearance.
This will leave the Secretary of State free either to proceed on the
basis of the letter or, if he considers it desirable to operate the new
policy, to afford the applicant a full opportunity to make
representations why, in his case it should not be followed.58
The reference to an overriding public interest may prove to be
significant in the future if the courts wish to provide more substantive
protection. Their lordships have given an indication that those who issue
statements or guidelines might be held to them unless there is an overriding
public interest to the contrary. This "subject to a contrary public interest"
approach would help to avoid part, though only part, of the fear that
administrative lawyers would have about introducing a general doctrine of
estoppel into English administrative law.59
The decision that comes closest to suggesting that legitimate
expectations may be protected substantively as well as procedurally is
Regina v. Home Secretary, ex parte Ruddock.60 The situation in Ruddock
arose after a certain Mr. Cox had his telephone tapped by the security
services. Cox claimed that the interception of his telephone calls was
contrary to criteria that had been repeatedly published and regularly applied
by the Home Office over a period of six years. The Home Secretary argued
that Cox could have no legitimate expectation that his calls would not be
57. Id. at 1347 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 1348 (emphasis added).
59. Given the current state of the law, one of the dangers of advocating an approach whereby a
legitimate expectation would guarantee a substantive, as opposed to procedural, outcome is that, in their
desire to disavow that approach, judges may resort to an inappropriate refusal to recognize a legitimate
expectation giving rise to any protection at all, even of a nonsubstantive kind. This danger is evident
in the case of Regina v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte United States Tobacco International, Inc.
[1992 I Q.B. 353.
60. Regina v. Home Secretary, ex parte Ruddock [1987] I W.L.R. 1482.
228 [Vol. 2:213
ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
intercepted since he could not have expected to be consulted or have a
hearing before a decision to intercept his calls was made. While the
legitimate expectation argument ultimately foundered on an absence of
evidence that the published criteria pertaining to wire taps had not been
followed, Taylor J., referring to fairness as the underlying basis for the
concept of legitimate expectations, concluded that:
Whilst most of the cases are concerned, as Lord Roskill said, with
a right to be heard, I do not think the doctrine is so confined.
Indeed, in a case where ex hypothesi there is no right to be heard,
it may be thought the more important to fair dealing that a promise
or undertaking given by a minister as to how he will proceed should
be kept. Of course such promise or undertaking must not conflict
with his statutory duty or his duty, as here, in the exercise of a
prerogative power.6
Apart from the national security aspect of Ruddock, which negated the
possibility of an individualized hearing prior to a decision to tap, the factual
situation in this case, with regard to the effect of published policy setting
out criteria for the exercise of discretion, is really very like the situation in
the Khan case. In Khan, before new criteria could be applied, the applicant
was found to have a right to make representations in respect of them.62
The judge explicitly stated in Ruddock that the Minister was quite entitled
to change the criteria, provided he followed the past practice of publishing
such changes. 63 The legitimate expectation was that the public should be
informed of a change in policy before any application of new criteria,
although the judgment was actually obiter on the legitimate expectations
point because Cox was unable to demonstrate that the Secretary of State had
not adhered to the published criteria.'
There is no suggestion within the concept of legitimate expectations that
a decision-making body can be required to do anything that is ultra vires or
not within its competence; the concept is being exercised with caution
though not without flexibility. With regard to providing procedural rather
than substantive protection, it must be remembered that, in practice, a
61. Id. at 1497.
62. See Khan [1984] 1 W.L.R. at 1347-48.
63. Regina v. Home Secretary, exparte Ruddock [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1482, 1497.
64. See id.
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variety of non-legal pressures make it unlikely that decisionmakers will
pursue their original substantive decision after it is judicially reviewed and
quashed on the grounds of having been illegally reached. However, it must
be emphasized that they can technically do so once they have followed the
decision-making steps required by the reviewing court. Yet, to take just one
example, it can also be argued that review for "unreasonableness" is an
illustration of a sphere of review of administrative action where there is, in
practice, a particularly fine line between deciding on the substance or merits
.of the case on the one hand, and the legality of the way in which a decision
was reached on the other. Nonetheless, the distinctions between appeal and
review and substance and procedure are still carefully preserved both by
English judges and their continental counterparts, such care being necessary
to maintain the respect of the public and ensure the tolerance of the
executive and legislative branches.
V. CONCLUSION
In the Factortame litigation and the Man (Sugar) case, we see English
courts dealing with issues directly involving Community law. Particularly
since the United Kingdom joined the European Community, English courts
have been increasingly inclined to look not only at the law of the
Community, which, depending on the subject matter of the case, may or
may not bind them, but also at the national domestic laws of individual
Member States such as France and Germany. This occurs despite the fact
that Member States' civilian traditions are different in nature, and freiluently
in intent, from Britain's common law. Even where Community influences
are not direct, the development of English common law has, in my view,
been accelerated and shaped by the very existence of a body of Community
law, itself influenced by national European laws and an even earlier set of
pan-European legal principles.65 The Community ethos has encouraged
wider international and comparative inquiry and consequent changes in legal
attitude and approach that extend beyond those required by Community
frameworks.
The definition of what is "public" for the purposes of English law is
very broad, sometimes surprisingly so for those more used to definitions of
65. See Peter Stein, Law After 1992 (1990) 111 CAMBRIDGE REV. 101.
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"public actor" in the United States. Thus, concepts recognized as being part
of English administrative law may have very wide-ranging consequences.
There is little doubt that two of the most interesting jurisprudential
adventures in modem English administrative law-those involving
proportionality and legitimate expectations-are at least in part attributable
to the increasing willingness of English judges to engage in comparative
analysis. Let us then await with interest developments that flow from the
process begun by the North American Free Trade Agreement in a nation that
rejoices in diverse local laws beneath a crown of shared legal principle.
Consider also whether Britain should incorporate the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms into domestic law so that it
will have a direct effect in English courts, thereby possibly incidentally
increasing the influence of British law on European law. If, as is currently
under discussion, the European Community accedes to the European
Convention on Human Rights, Britain may in any event find that the
question of incorporation is rendered partially moot and politically
irresistible.
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